We address the issue of the sources of dominant airlines' pricing power by separating premium due to hub operations from that due to airport dominance. Presence of airports serving as hubs for two carriers enables such identification via difference-in-differences. Moving from lower to higher prices, the total pricing premium of hub operators (both dominant and non-dominant) increases; while the share of the airport dominance premium diminishes relative to that of the hub premium. Absence of hub premium at the lower end of the price distribution (and lack of dominance premium at the higher prices) suggests frequent flier programs rather than product differentiation as the likely dominant source of hub operator's pricing power. Dominant airline's ability to charge higher fares due to either its airport market share or access to scarce airport facilities is confirmed.
Introduction
Among the possible sources of market power in the airline industry, airport dominance is pointed to as a very important one. At a basic level, the airport dominance effect refers to an airline's ability to charge higher fares for travel to or from an airport, where it has a dominant position, relative to the fares it charges for travel elsewhere within its network. Evans and Kessides (1993) concluded that the airport dominance is a far more important source of market power than route dominance. They further suggested that the source of the dominant carrier's market power could be either in supplying a different product, or in attracting a different kind of (i.e., price insensitive) traveler as compared to other airlines serving the same airport.
An airline dominating an airport does offer a different product as compared to other carriers serving the same gateway. Specifically, it offers direct flights to many more destinations than any other carrier at the airport. The dominant carrier uses its frequent flier program to reinforce this difference: customers living around the airport dominated by a certain carrier will value this airline's frequent flier program more highly, since they will be able to both earn awards (free trips, upgrades, premium status) faster and redeem them for travel to more destinations.
Major businesses value locating at cities that house hubs of major airlines precisely to have access to the carriers' networks, presumably knowing they will have to pay premium fares to respective dominant airlines. For example, when Boeing decided in late 1990s to move its corporate headquarters from Seattle, the two candidate cities were Denver and Chicago, both major airline hubs. The company completed its move to Chicago in September 2001. Bel and Fageda (2008) provide more systemic evidence to this effect.
Identifying the sources of what is defined in the literature as the airport dominance premium is both a difficult and an important task. As Kahn (1993) points out, if the dominant carrier attracts a disproportionate share of price-insensitive customers, the welfare impact of the ensuing price discrimination is ambiguous. Further, if customers overpay the dominant carrier for access to the network of non-stop flights, this may amount to little more than 'quality-based' pricing, or distribution of the corresponding rent between the customer and the airline rather than the market power of the latter. At the same time, frequent flier programs are also considered sources of market power (they may both affect market structure at hub airports -for instance, by discouraging entryand give the dominant airline an advantage over the competition it does face). Finally, we cannot rule out the potential contribution of the 'old-fashioned' market power, based on the dominant airline's airport market share.
The broad aim of this study is to address the issue of the sources of higher fares charged by the airlines in dominated airports. More specifically, we disentangle what manifests itself (and is referred to in the literature) as the airport dominance effect into the two components: the hub premium and the dominance premium. We exploit the fact that five US airports (Atlanta, Denver, Dallas-Fort Worth, Chicago O'Hare, and Phoenix) serve as a hub for two major airlines. Further, three of these five gateways have a clearly defined dominant carrier. The hub premium will then refer to the pricing differential commanded by a hub operator over the airlines not using a given airport as their hub.
The dominance premium (if any) is commanded by the dominant hub operator over the airline operating its hub but not enjoying the dominant position.
If only the dominance premium (as we define it) is observed in the data, this will imply that establishing a hub does not by itself give the airline any pricing power. This result would be most consistent with 'classical' market power due to the airport dominance (and very consistent with Borenstein's (1989) conclusion that the airport dominance does not provide any umbrella for other carriers at the airport).
If we only observe the hub premium but not the dominance premium, we can say that establishing a hub is all an airline needs to be able to charge their customers higher fares. That is, an airline's market power is defined not by the size of its airport presence, but by the presence of a network of non-stop flights (quite possibly reinforced by a frequent flier program, attracting a disproportionate share of price insensitive business travelers).
For our analysis, we use a sample of actual itineraries collected quarterly by the US Department of Transportation (this dataset is known as DB1B). From this sample, we select non-stop and one-stop roundtrip itineraries that originate, terminate or go through one of the five hub airports. We apply a relatively simple difference-in-differences identification strategy, focusing on an airport-pair-market (APM) fixed effects model, and applying an instrumental variable technique to control for possible endogeneity in market concentration and market share. We also conduct our analysis focusing on both average fares and prices representative of the upper and lower end of the distribution.
We find rather robust evidence in support of the existence of the hub premium both in the middle and on the upper end of the price spectrum. The airport dominance premium is detected in regressions using average and lower fares as the dependent variable.
3 Our results effectively suggest that, contrary to Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005) and Berry et al. (2006) , it is the average traveler who is paying the 'traditional' airport dominance premium; the price-insensitive business traveler pays equal premiums for traveling to/from an airline's hub, whether the airline has a dominant position at its hub airport or not. In other words, a substantial share of the premium paid by travelers at the upper end of the price distribution appears to be driven not by airport dominance, but by the nature of the (higher quality) product offered by the airline operating the hub.
Evidence of the absence of hub premium at the lower end of price spectrum suggests that frequent flier programs rather than product differentiation is the source of the airport dominance premium.
Our results imply that both pure airport dominance and the nature of the product offered by an airline operating a hub-and-spoke network contribute to higher fares charged by dominant carriers. 4 The former is more pronounced at average fares/yields, while the latter dominates at the upper end of the price distribution. Carriers operating a hub at an airport, but not enjoying the dominant position are still able to charge the hub premium. Thus, the 'umbrella' initially thought to be available only to dominant carriers (and, according to recent results, to those carriers' frequent flier program partners) applies to any hub operator able to reinforce its hub position with the customer loyalty program.
Our analysis advances our understanding of the nature of fare premiums charged by the airlines dominating major airports. At the same time, a number of issues remain not addressed. While we are able to assert that frequent flier programs do reinforce 3 Some specifications suggest travelers at the upper end of the price distribution pay (on average) higher premiums for traveling with the non-dominant hub operator than with the dominant airline. 4 Technically, the degree to which we have been able to disentangle the two effects is directly related to plausibility of our identifying assumptions. We will defer more detailed discussion to an appropriate section of this paper.
airlines' pricing power, we cannot pin down exact estimates of this role. We believe that to properly address this issue one would need much richer data than what is currently publicly available.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses identification strategy in general terms.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses results of the data analysis. Section 6 concludes. Borenstein (1989) showed that an airline dominating an airport is able to charge higher fares. Airport dominance was not, however, found to provide other carriers serving the same gateway an 'umbrella' for also charging higher prices. The airport dominance effect was attributed to the airlines' frequent flier programs and a feature of the ticket distribution market prevalent at that time. 5 Further, Borenstein (1991) showed that a dominant airline had a disproportionately large market share of hub-originating passengers (as opposed to passengers terminating at the same hub). Evans and Kessides (1993) asserted that airport dominance was a more important source of market power than route dominance (Borenstein's 1989 study suggested route market share was also an important determinant of observed fare premiums).
Relevant Literature
The US regulatory authorities have also paid attention to the airport dominance effect. In a 1990 report, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that airlines' transition to the hub-and-spoke networks following deregulation resulted in important airports being dominated by a single airline. The report further claimed that this position allowed the dominant airlines to charge a premium for their flights to/from the respective airport. Estimates of dominance premiums were also provided. In their 1995 book, Morrison and Winston criticized the GAO report for not controlling for many relevant factors (their analysis produced smaller hub premiums than those calculated by the GAO).
5 Most of the tickets were then distributed by 'brick-and-mortar' travel agents, receiving commission from the airlines. Further, airlines often paid so-called TACOs (travel agent commission overrides), or payments to agents booking more than a certain share of itineraries with a single airline. Airlines discontinued commission payments to travel agents in [2001] [2002] ; currently, travel service distributors charge their customers fixed per booking fees (see Bilotkach and Pejcinovska (2011) for further discussion). Berry et al. (2006) , having estimated a structural differentiated product model of the airline industry, suggested that airlines' ability to command airport dominance premium was limited to the upper end of the price distribution. Consistent with this finding, Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005) showed that the observed hub premiums could be explained by the passenger mix (proportion of leisure versus business travelers). Bilotkach (2007) demonstrated that the airport dominance effect applied to a number of transatlantic routes 6 . Lederman (2008) showed that uniting frequent flier programs was a way nondominant airlines could get under the 'umbrella' available to the dominant carriers, thereby providing evidence of importance of frequent flier programs as a factor behind the airport dominance premium. Ciliberto and Williams (2010) demonstrated that the hub premium is higher on the upper end of the price distribution, also suggesting that limited access to airport facilities explains part of this premium. 7 Bilotkach and Lakew (2013) offer what they call a "30,000-feet view" at the airport concentration -price relationship, analyzing a 17-year panel of airport-level data for all airports in the US. This study confirms the role of airport dominance as the key source of market power, not only for large hubs, but also for the small airports, which tend to be concentrated as well.
Identification

Identifying Assumptions
Identifying assumptions which will enable our estimation strategy are the following.
First, we suppose that hub premium applies to both carriers operating a hub at a given airport. Second, we assume that the airport dominance component of the fare premium only applies to the dominant carrier. We will discuss the plausibility of the first assumption in the next paragraph. The second assumption is clearly the less defensible of the two: we will see from the data that in all airports in our sample, each hub operator has a larger presence than any other airline. Therefore, it is possible that an airport dominance 6 Evidence on the European side (Lijesen et al., 2001 , Marin, 1995 , Bachis and Piga, 2007 is inconclusive, perhaps due to the fact that researchers had to use either offered or aggregated actual fares in their research. 7 All five of the airports included in our study are in Ciliberto and Williams' paper; however, they do not measure hub premiums for the non-dominant hub operators at Atlanta, Denver, and Dallas. Nor do they consider Southwest Airlines as operating a hub at Phoenix. premium applies to both hub operators, and not only to the dominant carrier. We will return to this issue when discussing estimation results. 
Identification Strategy
Two approaches to measuring airport dominance effect (using the term as it has been previously defined in the relevant studies) have been employed in the literature. The first approach is to compare an airline's fares for flights to and from the airport where it has a dominant position to fares elsewhere within the airline's network. The second approach compares the dominant airline's fares for travel to or from the corresponding airport to prices charged by other airlines flying into or from the same airport, but not enjoying the dominant position. Neither of the two approaches, however, is able to disentangle the hub effect from the dominance effect, as we call them.
To separate the dominance effect on observed fares (and yields) from the hub effect, we examine price setting at airports serving as hubs for two carriers. We can say that our exercise combines the two above-discussed approaches to measuring airport dominance in the following way. In an airport used by two carriers as a hub, any premium charged by the dominant airline for non-stop flights to or from this hub relative to fares charged over the remainder of that airline's network includes both the hub effect and the dominance effect, whereas the same difference for the non-dominant hub operator only includes the hub effect. Both non-stop fares, however, also include airlinespecific effects. To weed these effects out, we include into our sample the one-stop itineraries connecting via the respective hub airports -those itineraries do not include either dominance or hub effects, only the airline effects. Formally, we can express the corresponding fares in the following way:
Here denotes price charged by the dominant hub operator for non-stop flights to/from the hub airport; is same for the non-dominant hub operator; and is the price charged by a hub operator for one-stop flight connecting via the corresponding hub airport. Then, the difference-in-differences estimator that will identify the dominance effect is:
That is, dominance effect is identified using the hub operators' fares charged by them for flights to/from their hubs relative to what they charge elsewhere (i.e., for flights connecting via those same hubs).
To identify the hub effect from the data we will use the fares charged by other carriers (those not operating a hub at a given airport) offering services to/from a given airport. Presence in the data of other carriers' itineraries going via the hubs in question (more on this in the data section) allows us to identify a similar non-stop -one-stop price differential for those airlines, eventually permitting identification of the hub effect as:
We will use the non-dominant hub operator for our identification here. The hub effect is identified by comparing fares charged by the hub operator to prices of the other airlines flying into the same hub airport.
Thus, our identification strategy is a simple difference-in-differences. Successful implementation of this strategy will require data on fares for travel to/from, as well as through the hub airports selected for the analysis. Note that this strategy is similar to that applied by Bilotkach (2007) to analyze price setting (including obtaining estimates of the airport dominance effect) on several transatlantic airline markets.
Data and Methodology
Airports -background
To enable separation of the hub premium from that due to the airport dominance, we selected five airports, each of which serves as a hub for two airlines. Note that in two of the three airports dominated by a single carrier the dominant airline shares the gateway with a so-called low cost carrier (Frontier and AirTran). The conventional wisdom suggests that low-cost carriers do not operate hub-and-spoke networks in the same way as traditional legacy carriers do. However, on the US market Southwest Airlines is the only such carrier, still channeling over half of its traffic via its 'quasi-hubs' (PHX being one of them). AirTran and Frontier, on the other hand, operate clearly defined single-hub networks, with the former to a degree specializing in vacation traffic to Florida destinations, and Frontier running a rather typical 'coast-to-coast and inbetween' hub-and-spoke network.
According to the US Department of Transportation, in 2007 the five airports we selected for our study handled over 270 million passengers in the US market (and another 40-plus million international travelers). To put these numbers in perspective, note that US 
Methodology
We will use two average price measures as dependent variable: natural logarithm of fare, as well as natural logarithm of yield (fare per mile). Fare is, as discussed above, the passenger-weighted average price aggregated at the airline-routing-quarter level. In addition to the passenger-weighted average price, we calculated standard deviation of the same. To be in line with previous studies considering airport dominance effect at the upper tail of the price distribution, we use the natural logarithm of average plus standard deviation fare (as well as of the corresponding yield) in some specifications. Using this measure to get an idea of how prices behave at the upper tail of the distribution might be unorthodox, 13 and it cuts off observations for airlines observed offering a single fare on a given airport-pair market. 14 But then, small players are also likely to introduce noise into our data, as we observe their behavior in a non-systematic way.
Our estimation technique of choice is the airport-pair-market fixed-effects. We estimate both the regular fixed effects and the instrumental variable specifications. We had to find instruments for the measures of market concentration (HerfindhalHirschmann Index) and market power (airline's market share on the route). Consistent with the previous literature, one-year lagged HHI was used as an instrument for the former. Evans and Kessides (1993) note that finding an appropriate instrument for market share is a difficult task. We decided to instrument the airline's route market share with the average of the airline's market shares across the routes originating at the respective airport, excluding the current route. This measure is generally in the spirit of using variables from other markets the firm operates in to instrument for the same measure on the current market. It also potentially suffers from the possibility of being correlated with the error term in case of a shock affecting an airline's flights to all destinations from a given airport. 15 Using the firm's intra-route rank of the market share as the instrument, as done by Evans and Kessides (1993) , is complicated in our case by the fact that we calculate market shares for one-stop trips separately from those for non-stop flights.
Markets end up being quite competitive at the one-stop level, 16 meaning that demand and other unobservable price shocks can lead to change in ranks of the firms' market sharesaccording to Evans and Kessides, in such a case intra-route rank will no longer be a valid instrument for the market share. In our data, our instrument of choice turned out 13 Upper percentiles (such as upper quartile, 80 th or 90 th percentile) of observed price distributions have been typically used in the literature. If we believe that distribution of fares is close to log-normal; our measure corresponds to approximately 85 th percentile (based on one-sigma rule for normal distributions). 14 For these observations, standard deviation cannot be obtained. 15 Such as an unusually aggressive advertising campaign at the city of origin -just as using a variable from another market as an instrument can make it correlated with the error term if a firm undertakes a nationwide advertising campaign. 16 While mean HHI for one-stop itineraries (0.48) is not that lower than for non-stop ones (0.57); there is an appreciable mass of routes that are competitive at the one-stop level. More specifically, lower quartile of HHI at one-stop level is close in value (0.31) to the lower decile for HHI at the non-stop level.
reasonably well correlated with the variable it instruments for -with correlation coefficient of 0.51.
In all specifications, we make a distinction between the following indicators of airlines' hub and dominant positions (these will be our key variables): The dominance effect is identified by the difference between the coefficients for dominant and non-dominant hub operator's non-stop itineraries. The hub effect is identified via the difference between the sum of and and .
Formally, the estimate of the dominance effect is obtained from the regression results as:
Whereas the estimate of the hub effect, assuming ̂ is positive, is obtained as:
Sample and Variables
Our main data source is the US Department of Transportation Origin and Destination Survey, databank DB1B. The DB1B is a 10 percent sample of actual itineraries, collected by the US Department of Transportation. In this databank, the itineraries are grouped at the fare-airline-service-class-routing level (e.g., $400 for trip from Los Angeles to
Denver to Boston and back to Los Angeles via Denver on United Airlines). The number of passengers found to pay a certain fare flying a certain airline on a certain route is also reported. The data is collected quarterly and is made available for download from the Department's web site free of charge. 17 We use DB1B for all quarters from 1999 through
2005.
Each entry in the DB1B includes fare paid (net of taxes and fees), class of service, 18 and detailed information on routing, including identity of airlines selling the ticket and operating each flight, distance traveled, and all intermediate airports visited.
The destination of the trip is coded through the directional break in itinerary.
Our sample consists of trips that originate, terminate, or connect through Denver, Atlanta, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Phoenix, or Chicago O'Hare airports. We apply the following filters to arrive at the final sample of itineraries that will be used for analysis.
 Each segment in the itinerary had to be served by the same airline, with regional carriers re-coded as corresponding major airlines. We therefore excluded interline itineraries.
 To ensure consistency across all years and quarters, we only include restricted economy class itineraries for all airlines except Southwest Airlines (which reports all its itineraries as restricted first class). Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005) used data from the third quarter of 2000 and separated restricted economy class itineraries from unrestricted economy class and first class itineraries as a way to capture passenger mix on the markets. We, however, found that the carriers are rather inconsistent in 17 This relates to the dataset for the US market. The International DB1B remains a restricted datasetpermission from the Department of Transportation is required to obtain access to this data. 18 Technically, services are classified as first unrestricted, first restricted, business unrestricted, business restricted, economy unrestricted, economy restricted.
separating the unrestricted economy itineraries from the restricted ones across the quarters in our sample. At the same time, the restricted economy 19 classification is used most frequently (over 85 percent of the time), and restricted economy fares appear to span the expected range of economy class fares rather well.
 We converted all fares into real dollars (with 2000 as the base year), using seasonally adjusted GDP price index, reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
 In line with previous studies (e.g., Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005) , itineraries with yield less than 2 cents per mile in year 2000 prices (i.e., about $100 for a coast-tocoast roundtrip ticket) were dropped.
 We only selected non-stop or one-stop roundtrip flights without open jaws (i.e., return trips to the same airports) and with a single directional break (i.e., no multi-city trips).
 One-stop roundtrip itineraries had to connect through the same airport in both directions.
 To avoid contaminating our data with small markets (for which obtaining a representative picture will be difficult), we only chose those markets where 100 or more passengers were observed in our sample in a given quarter. This means, roughly speaking, that we only look at markets with annual passenger traffic of over 4000
passengers, or about eleven passengers per day. It should be noted that looking only at sufficiently large market is a typical practice in the airline industry studies.
We then constructed our dependent variable as the passenger-weighted mean fare at the airline-routing-quarter level (we will use natural logarithm of this in our regressions).
This means, for instance, that American Airlines' fares between the same airports via different hubs (Chicago and Dallas-Ft. Worth) are viewed separately. Also, should an airline offer both non-stop and one-stop products on the same market (e.g., Delta might, in addition to offering non-stop Los Angeles-Atlanta flights, channel some of the traffic between the two cities via Dallas), average fares for such non-stop and one-stop services were computed separately. We also computed passenger-weighted standard deviations at the airline-routing-quarter level. Finally, the passenger-weighted mean yields (fare per mile) were computed. 19 We found no information on whether there are any formal criteria to differentiate between restricted and unrestricted fares: while non-refundable ticket requiring 21-day advance purchase is clearly 'restricted', we are not sure, for instance, how a refundable ticket requiring 3-day advance purchase would be coded.
observations, spanning over 5,400 unique directional airport-pair markets. We are thus looking at approximately 2,700 relatively large airport-pair markets in the country 20 -a typical restriction the literature is to consider up to top 1000 city-pair or airport-pair routes. Since all the passengers at the airline-routing-quarter level are collapsed into a single observation corresponding to the average fare, most of our observations correspond to one-stop products. 21 We should also note that not all of the one-stop observations correspond to the airlines channeling passengers via their own hubs. For example, in addition to the hub operators United and Frontier; American, Alaska, Delta, Northwest, and US Airways are also found to channel their passengers via Denver. Same holds true for other hub airports we focus on.
Before we continue with discussion of control variables, it pays to clarify our definition of airlines. In the US market, some of the commercial passenger services (particularly on thinner markets) are performed by so-called regional carriers, effectively operating as agents of major airlines. These carriers' business model relies on operating smaller aircraft on shorter-haul routes, exploiting cost savings due to less diverse fleet and outsourced marketing. Interestingly enough, Jordan (2008) showed that, by looking at exit rates in the US airline industry since deregulation, regional airlines' model appears the most successful one -fewer regional carriers exited, both in absolute and relative terms, as compared to both legacy, new full-service, and discount airlines. Those regional carriers can be either independent companies (SkyWest, Atlantic Southeast); or fully owned subsidiaries of major carriers (American Eagle); some of them (ExpressJet) market services under their brands in addition to acting as major carriers' agents.
Moreover, several of those regional carriers perform services for more than one major airline (e.g., SkyWest flies as a Delta, United, and Midwest agent). We decided to assign regional carriers' services to respective major airlines (since pricing decisions are made at the major airline level). More detailed information about this assignment can be found in the Appendix.
We will use respective indicator variables to control for year-specific, quarterspecific, year-quarter-specific, and airline-specific heterogeneities. 22 We should also note that, since our specifications will effectively include indicator variables for all non-stop services, airline indicator variables will measure the effects of through-hub services.
Distance and an indicator for non-stop flights are the two itinerary-specific controls we use. In the airport-pair market fixed effects model, we expect the coefficient on distance to have a negative sign, as it measures the effect of a more circuitous (and therefore less desirable) route on the fares between two airports. Non-stop flights, however, should be more expensive than one-stops, other things equal. Table 2 .
Data Analysis
Results and Discussion
Tables 3 and 4 report our estimation results. Table 3 shows results for both average and high fare, reporting the output for both price and yield as dependent variables. Table 4 presents the estimation results for the lower end of the pricing distribution. The dependent variable in these specifications is the natural logarithm of weighted average yield minus one third of the standard deviation of the same.
We have also conducted our estimation exercise on sub-samples of itineraries going via either of the five hub airports. These results -available from the authors upon request -largely confirm our findings reported in Tables 3 and 4. The main conclusion that follows from Tables 3 and 4 is that airport dominance effect is more pronounced in average and low fares than at the upper end of the price distribution, whereas hub effect is clearly present at the high end of price distribution.
There is also some evidence that hub carrier's pricing power extends to the middle of the fare distribution. However, pricing premium present in the low fares is due to airport dominance rather than hub operations. Another interesting and unexpected result from the high end of the price distribution is that both fares and yields of the non-dominant hub operators are higher than same for the dominant airlines -hence the negative estimate of the dominance effect reported for instrumental variable specifications in Table 3 .
To appreciate the magnitude of the effects and put our results into clearer perspective, consider the following example. We will focus on specifications with the natural logarithm of yield as the dependent variable, and considering results for two-stage least squares regressions. From Table 3 it is evident that for the average yield hub operators enjoy about 8.3 percent premium above other carriers flying from/into the same hub (the difference between the estimates on Hub Operator*Direct and Other Carriers*Direct interaction variables). With the mean yield for non-stop trips in our sample at 25.5 cents per mile (same number for the entire sample is 14.9 cents per mile 23 ), our estimate suggests that an airline operating a hub charges on average 2.1 cents per mile more than an airline flying to/from the same airport and not operating a hub there. To put this in perspective, consider a route between Atlanta and Denver -two of the hubs included into our analysis. With the roundtrip distance for the non-stop journey between the two airports at 2400 miles, the average total premium implied by our above estimate is $50.40 in year 2000 prices, or $60.14 in year 2007 prices. Note also that the mean roundtrip price for a non-stop itinerary in our sample is $349.41 in year 2000
dollars.
The estimate of the dominance effect for average yield in the instrumental variable specification suggests that the non-dominant hub operators' average yields are about 5.5 percent lower than their dominant counterparts. Given the sample average yield for non-stop itineraries reported above, our estimate of the airport dominance effect is equivalent to about 1.40 cents per mile. The corresponding estimate of the hub effect implies that the non-dominant hub operator's yields for non-stop flights out the hub airport are 6.2 percent (1.58 cents per mile) higher than same for an airline not operating a hub but flying to/from a given airport. Thus, of the total of about 3 cents per mile average yield premium the dominant carrier is estimated to charge in our sample, about 53 percent is due to the hub operation of this airline, and 47 percent -due to airport dominance.
Coming back to our Atlanta-Denver example; our estimates suggest that due to the airport dominance effect, the dominant hub operators (Delta and United) will charge on average $33.60 in year 2000 prices more than the non-dominant hub operators (AirTran and Frontier) on the same route. The estimate of the hub effect tells us that all four airlines, due to operating hubs at one or the other endpoint, are able to charge $37.94 more than would a hypothetical carrier wishing to operate on this route outside of its general hub-and-spoke network. Note also that all these estimates are over and above the airline specific effects.
At the upper tail of the price distribution, however, the non-dominant hub operators enjoy about 6.3 percent premium over dominant airlines. 24 This amounts to 2.7 cents per mile, given that the average 'high yield' for non-stop roundtrip itineraries in our sample is 43 cents per mile. This translates into $64.80 price differential for our AtlantaDenver non-stop roundtrip (the average 'high price' -weighted average fare plus standard deviation -for the non-stop roundtrip itineraries in our sample is about $602).
While a hub operator on average enjoys a higher premium at the upper end of the yield distribution than in the middle (eighteen percent, or 7.74 cents per mile), there is strictly speaking no dominance effect to speak about. The magnitude of the hub premium at the upper end of yield distribution is then 21.8 percent, or 9.4 cents per mile. Thus, at the 24 An alternative interpretation -higher market power of the non-dominant hub operators -is not very plausible, since non-dominant operators' market shares are much lower than those of the dominant airlines.
upper end of the yield distribution, most (if not all) of the pricing premium of the hub operator can be attributed to the operation of the hub, and not the carrier's dominant position at the airport.
Note also that the airport-pair market fixed effects regressions not controlling for potential endogeneity paint a somewhat different picture. At the average yields, there is no hub premium. The hub operator's 'averaged' premium for its non-stop flights to/from the hub is still about 8 percent, the dominance premium is estimated at 15 percent, while there is no hub premium. At the upper end of the yield distribution, simple fixed effects regression suggests the airport dominance premium of almost 11.2 percent, and the hub premium of about 15.6 percent.
Notwithstanding the discrepancy between the fixed effects and the instrumental variable estimation results, there is clear evidence that the estimated airport dominance premium is smaller relative to the hub premium at the upper end of the price distribution than at the average fares. We should also note that of the two estimation approaches we tend to put more faith into the instrumental variable specifications -market concentration and market shares are clearly endogenously determined in the price regressions, implying that fixed effects least squares estimates will be both biased and inconsistent.
In general, we found that airlines enjoying the dominant position at an airport are able to extract the airport dominance premium from an average and more price conscious travelers. Premium charged to the higher paying customers appears to be related more to the fact that the airline operating a hub offers its customers a different product, perhaps the main differentiating characteristic of which is the access to a network of destinations other carriers do not offer, rather than to the carrier's market share at the hub airport.
The only real surprise in coefficients on the control variables is lower fares for direct flights in some specifications. The possible explanation of this result is that the direct flights in our sample are shorter than the one-stop itineraries, and the logarithm of distance alone does not cope with this well. Note that this counterintuitive relationship is far less common in the regressions where yield is used as a dependent variable.
One may find it strange that our results appear to suggest that firms on more concentrated markets charge lower fares. However, one has to note that our specifications include both market share and HHI, and that we examine price-setting at the individual airline rather than the market level. Holding the market share fixed, higher HHI simply means that competitors an airline faces in the market have become stronger. Expected effect of this change on fares charged by an individual carrier is actually uncertain. On one hand, more concentration can lead to all airlines involved raising their fares due to higher market power. On the other hand, stronger competitors may mean fiercer competition and lower fares to keep market share intact. The latter effect appears to dominate. Note also that higher market share holding HHI constant leads to higher fares, as expected. For instance, our results indicate that, other things equal, a monopoly airline's average yield will be 3.7 percent higher than same for an airline operating on a symmetric duopoly market. 25 For an airline holding 50 percent market share, a merger between the two competitors each holding 25 percent market share will imply -assuming the carrier still has 50 percent market share after the merger -a 4.5 percent decrease in average yield (HHI changes from 0.375 to 0.5 as a result of such a merger). The merged airline, however, will be able to command a 6.4 percent higher average yield as compared to what the carriers would have charged before the merger.
Interpretation
Let us discuss what our results tell us about the possible sources of pricing premiums charged by the airlines operating hubs at the airport. Our main result is that this premium applies to either airline operating a hub, whether it dominates the airport or not. Another result that appears robust is that the composition of the pricing premium is different at the upper end of the pricing distribution, with the airport dominance premium playing a lesser role than at the average fares/yields.
The proposed explanations of the dominant airline's pricing power at the respective airports included airport market share, product differentiation, airlines' loyalty programs, and control of scarce airport resources. While we are unable to directly comment on the latter, we can say that our results show two things. First, there appears to be something different in the product that the hub operators offer as compared to other airlines. Second, the firm's market share at the airport does play a role. At the same time, the diminishing share of the airport dominance premium as we move up the fare distribution suggests product differentiation appears a more important determinant than the airport market share for the price insensitive consumers.
But, where are the frequent flier programs in this? The airlines do use their loyalty programs to reinforce product differentiation and extract some premium from their customers. Lederman (2008) exploited the airlines' frequent flier program partnerships to
show that partner airlines without the dominant position at the airport are able to charge the fare premium just like the dominant carrier -that is, carriers offering a different product are able to charge premium prices despite lack of dominance. Our finding that the airport dominance premium becomes smaller, while hub premium grows more important at the upper end of the distribution is evidence that frequent flier programs play some role as the determinant of the hub operators' price premium. Indeed, at the upper end of the price distribution we are more likely to encounter tickets purchased by frequent business travelers, who appear to be paying premium for the product differentiation aspect of hub operations (potentially reinforced by loyalty programs) rather than the dominant carrier's market share.
Presence of the hub effect in the middle of the price distribution is subject to a number of interpretations. On one hand, we can suggest this is the evidence favoring the product differentiation story behind the hub premium. At the same time, we cannot rule out that the non-dominant hub operator's fares and yields could also include the market share based effect (non-dominant hub operators boast larger airport market shares than other carriers). Additionally, loyalty programs could also affect the non-dominant operator's fares in the middle of the price distribution.
At the lower fares, however, we can expect relatively little effect of the loyalty programs, assuming those tickets are predominantly purchased by the leisure travelers who simply go for the best price. Therefore, any hub effect observed at the lower fares is likely due to product differentiation rather than loyalty programs. Recall that our estimation results demonstrate no hub premium at the lower end of the price distribution, consistently with this expectation, so that leisure travelers are paying premium prices based on the higher market share of the dominant carrier.
Given the above considerations, we can conclude that the dominant airline's market share at the airport allows it to charge a premium pretty much across the entire price spectrum. At the same time, the airline operating a hub at the same airport but holding a smaller market share is able to charge the corresponding premium to the price insensitive customers. Further, as the hub premium is more visible at higher prices (and dominance premium disappears on that end of price/yield distribution), this suggests that the source of this premium for the non-dominant hub operator is predominantly in its frequent flier program rather than access to a network of destinations served with nonstop flights. We however admit that this statement is subject to a number of caveats, most importantly the assumption that prices observed at the high-end of the distribution represent trips by business travelers that are loyal to a particular airline.
These findings suggest the following implications. First, the sources of the pricing premium by the hub operator are frequent flier programs and airport market shareproduct differentiation might also play a role, but our evidence does not point to this
consistently. Further, importance of the airport market share relative to frequent flier programs diminishes as we move to the higher fares. Higher magnitude of the total pricing premium on the upper tail of the distribution is consistent with previously reported findings that the dominant airline's pricing power applies more to the price insensitive than to average travelers. At the same time, we can claim that the dominant airline is able to charge premium prices to the business travelers thanks at least in part to the frequent flier program it operates. Most importantly, we demonstrate that any airline establishing a hub at an airport will be able, through its customer loyalty program (and presumably a product differentiation component), to attract some loyal price insensitive passengers and charge premium prices to them.
Conclusions
Airlines' ability to charge higher fares for flights to/from airports where they enjoy a dominant position has been a rather established fact More recent studies (Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005; Berry et al., 2006) suggested that the observed airport dominance premium appears to apply to price-insensitive business travelers.
The goal of our study is to approach the issue of sources of dominant airlines' pricing power by separating the "hub effect" from the "dominance effect". We note that every large airport which is dominated by a single carrier also serves as a hub in the respective carrier's network. The "hub effect" may exist due to the fact that the airline operating a hub at an airport will offer its customers access to a larger network of nonstop flights, possibly reinforced by the hub operator's frequent flier program. Thus, we define "hub effect" as premium charged by a hub operator; and "dominance effect" is then price premium charged by the dominant airline above that due to its hub operation.
Estimation of the two effects requires examining pricing at airports that serve as hubs for more than one carrier.
We use a sample of actual itineraries collected quarterly by the US Department of Transportation (this dataset is known as DB1B). For our analysis, we select non-stop and one-stop roundtrip itineraries that originate, terminate or go through one of the five airports which serve (or served) as a hub for two carriers: Atlanta, Chicago O'Hare, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Phoenix, and Denver. Data analysis shows that as we go from the lower to the higher prices, the total pricing premium increases, while the relative importance of the airport dominance component of this premium diminishes relative to the hub premium component. Further, while the source of the airport dominance premium appears to be the airline's dominance in terms of the airport market share (we cannot, however, exclude the possibility of the dominant airline's control of airport facilities as an explanation), the hub premium appears to be driven by the hub operators' frequent flier programs rather than by the potential product differentiation by itself.
We have effectively found additional evidence for the airlines' loyalty programs as a factor beyond the pricing premium charged by the dominant airlines at their hubs.
Yet, we clearly show that any hub operator, and not only the dominant airline, is capable of creating the pricing 'umbrella' at the airport where it has established significant presence. We also demonstrate that airport dominance remains an important determinant of the respective airline's market power, due to either the carrier's airport market share, or access to the airport's facilities.
One will be right to question the applicability of our results outside of our sample.
Especially interesting is the question of our study's implications for airports which are dominated by a single hub operator. Since identification of components of apparent fare premium will be impossible for such airports, we can only speculate on the distribution of the fare premium into the "hub effect" and "dominance effect" for those airports. We can, however, state that what this premium reflects is not only airlines exercising their market power, but also consumers' willingness to pay for the extensive network of nonstop flights not available from other cities, reinforced by the frequent flier programs which enable customers to accumulate miles faster, other things equal. Instrument for market share. Computed as the average market share for airline's services out of a given airport (separately for non-stop and onestop itineraries), excluding the current service.
In addition to the variables listed above; we have included year, quarter, year-quarter, and airline indicator variables into all regressions reported in the paper. Notes: 1. Dependent variable is natural logarithm of price or yield. Average price/yield corresponds to passenger-weighted mean, as discussed in text; high price/yield is passenger-weighted mean plus standard deviation, as discussed in text. 2. FE stands for airport-pair market fixed effects model; IV is fixed effects model with instrumental variables. 3. All specifications include other control variables as indicated in the text, which are not reported. 4. Star indicates lack of statistical significance at 5 percent level. 5. Distance was used instead of log(distance) as independent variable in specifications with yield as the dependent variable. 
